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Maturity Models and Safety Culture: A Critical Review 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The available evidence suggests that maturity models are a popular means of 
assessing safety culture in organisations. The aim of the present study was to 
review their conceptual underpinnings and roots, as well as provide details of 
how they have been used to assess safety culture (e.g., types of methods used, 
coverage of safety domains). A total of 41 publications were reviewed based on a 
set of selection criteria (e.g., studies which explicitly reported data or a case 
study which used a maturity model). The findings indicate steady growth in the 
use of maturity models to assess safety culture particularly within domains such 
as construction, the oil and gas industries and healthcare. We also found that 
most studies focus on providing a descriptive account of safety culture using 
maturity models and make limited attempts to assess the reliability/validity of 
outcomes from their use. We discuss the strengths and weaknesses of maturity 
models in the light of our findings, alongside identifying a number of new 
directions for future work of relevance to safety researchers and practitioners 
(e.g., the need for more detailed case studies of the use of maturity models to 
assess safety, as well as more attention to the underlying theory guiding use of 
maturity models). 
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1. Introduction 
Some of the most compelling arguments that culture and safety might contribute 
to accidents and disasters were made in the late 1970s by Barry Turner in his 
pioneering work ‘Man-Made Disasters’ (Turner, 1978; Pidgeon, 1988). 
Following the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster the term ‘safety culture’ started to 
be regularly used amongst a broad community of safety scientists, psychologists 
and other groups (Silbey, 2009). There are a number of different explanations for 
the rise in interest in the construct of safety culture including increasing 
recognition of the importance of cultural aspects of health and safety 
management (Cooper, 2000; Cox and Cheyne, 2000; Flin et al., 2000; Reason, 
1998) and the shift in the last few decades towards a focus on organisational 
factors governing risk and safety (Borys et al., 2009; Waterson et al., 2015; 
Robertson et al., 2016). As a result, many contemporary organisations strive to 
understand and improve their safety culture in order to deliver effective health 
and safety management and enhance their safety performance (Antonsen, 2009a; 
Reason, 1998, 2016).   
 
At the same time, amongst researchers and academics, there have been a number 
of criticisms levelled at the construct of safety culture. Henriqson et al. (2014) 
for example, argue that the study safety culture encourages the view that safety is 
a widely shared norm, value or set of beliefs within organisations which masks 
important conflicts and disagreements which may exist amongst employees and 
managers. Others (e.g., Reiman and Rollenhagen, 2014; Dekker, 2018) suggest 
that a preoccupation with safety culture has shifted the focus away from more 
systemic accounts of the causes of accidents and encouraged a rather ore 
superficial account of how safety is related to system levels and other 
organisational dynamics (e.g., how safety culture changes over time). Finally, 
Antonsen (2009b) compared qualitative and quantitative descriptions of the 
safety culture in the same organisation (a Norwegian oil and gas platform) and 
found them to be dramatically different, leading him to cast doubt on the 
predictive validity of safety culture assessments.  In the present paper we focus 
on a review of one popular tool or approach which is used to assess safety culture, 
namely maturity models. A later section of the paper discusses the findings from 
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our review in the light of contemporary criticisms of the safety culture construct, 
alongside a consideration of how maturity models fit within debates centred on 
research-practice gaps within safety science and human factors (Chung and 
Shorrock, 2011; Waterson, 2016). 
 
2. Safety culture: some current challenges 
2.1 Defining ‘safety culture’ 
Despite the considerable literature covering theoretical and empirical aspects of 
safety culture (Antonsen, 2009; Cox and Flin, 1998; Diaz-Cabrera et al., 2007; 
Flin et al., 2000; Hopkins, 2006; Lee and Harrison, 2000; Mearns et al., 2009) 
there is still a lack of consensus and agreement about how to define the construct 
as well as assessment methods and on the overall structure of safety culture 
assessment (Mkrtchyan and Turcanu, 2012). The difference between safety 
climate and safety culture, for example, has been debated over decades by a 
number of safety researchers (Flin et al., 2000; Griffin and Curcuruto, 2016). 
Safety culture typically refers to the underlying assumptions and values that 
guide behaviour in organizations rather than the direct perceptions of individuals 
(Griffin and Curcuruto, 2016). Safety climate, by contrast, is sometimes regarded 
as the surface features of the safety culture discerned from the workforce’s 
attitudes and perceptions at a given point in time (Flin et al., 2000). Andrew Hale 
(2000) refers to these and a range of other discussions centred on safety culture 
(e.g., the relation of culture to other aspects of safety management and 
behaviour) as examples of ‘culture’s confusions’. More recently, Hale stated:“… 
safety culture is problematic in many of the same ways that ‘accident proneness’ 
was in the last century; in terms of its attributional consequences, the difficulties 
of defining it and the difficulties of deciding what you should measure as the 
outcome of its presence or absence; either accidents or other intermediate 
measures of safety” (Waterson, 2017). 
 
2.2 The theoretical status of safety culture 
A number of authors have attempted to characterise the various theoretical 
approaches and methods which have been used to assess safety culture.  Silbey 
(2009) for example, describes three dominant ‘lenses’ which characterise what 
she terms as ‘talk about safety and culture’. The first ‘lens’, ‘culture as causal 
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attitude’, view safety culture as something that is measureable and comprises the 
values, competencies, attitudes and behaviours about safety which exist within 
organisations. From this point of view culture “determine[s] the commitment to, 
and the style and proficiency of, an organisations’ health and safety programs” 
(Silbey, 2009, p. 350 quoting Reason, 1997, p. 194). By contrast, the second 
‘lens’, ‘culture as engineered organisation’ whilst similarly focusing on the 
importance of cultural factors on safety outcomes, places more emphasis on how 
an organisation configures its processes and practices in order to improve safety, 
reliability and resilience. Proponents of the High Reliability Organisations 
(HROs) approach towards safety are viewed by Silbey (2009) as examples of the 
‘culture as engineered organisation’ approach to safety culture (e.g., Eisenhardt, 
1993; La Porte and Rochlin, 1994; Weick, 1987). A third ‘lens’ refers to ‘culture 
as emergent and indeterminate’. From this point of view, safety culture is 
understood to be socially constructed and mediated by artefacts and material, 
both mental and representational (Gherardi and Nicolini, 2000).  
 
An alternative characterisation of safety culture and ways in which it is 
conceptualised and assessed which draws partly on Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) 
analysis of sociological paradigms is provided by Guldenmund (2010, 2016). 
Guldenmund describes three approaches: (1) interpretative or anthropological 
approaches – these often treat culture as a system of meanings and symbols 
shared between groups of individuals who participate in this social process. 
Culture cannot be changed easily and cannot be assessed easily using scientific 
methods (Geertz, 1973; Alvesson, 2007; Martins, 1992). Qualitative methods, 
such as a narrative study, phenomenology, grounded theory, ethnography or case 
studies (Antonsen, 2009), or various combinations of these approaches, are 
methods used by an interpretative approach. Data collection such interviews, 
observational studies, document analysis are typically used to provide clues to 
underlying cultural assumptions (e.g., Scott et al., 2003); (2) analytical or 
psychological approaches – this is similar to Silbey’s notion of ‘culture as 
causal attitude’, however, specifically relates to the use  of questionnaires and  to 
assess safety culture and the analysis of dimensions, factors and other statistical 
and psychometric properties of the survey instrument being used; (3) pragmatic 
or experience-based approaches – this approach focuses on the structure and 
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interactions within an organisation and the dynamic interplay between these 
which shapes and influences culture. The pragmatic approach also places 
emphasis on the types of processes that an organisation should have in order to 
achieve a mature or advanced status with regard to safety culture. These 
processes are reflected in  Geller’s approach towards Total Safety Culture 
(Geller, 1994) and safety culture maturity models such as the Shell Hearts and 
Minds programme (Hudson and Willekes, 2000; Hudson, 2007). 
 
2.3 Aims, objectives and organisation of the current study 
The focus of the current study is to outline the results of carrying a literature 
review on one particular approach towards safety culture, namely the use of 
maturity models for safety culture assessment. There is some evidence to suggest 
that maturity models are increasing in popularity (e.g., Fleming, 2001, 2017;  
Goncalves Filho et al., 2010; Parker et al., 2006; Health and Safety Technology 
and Management, 2017; Office of Rail and Road, 2017). Previous reviews have 
been carried out on the subject of maturity models and their use within domains 
such as software, management, business process management, information 
management and information technology management (Backer et al., 2009; 
Maier et al., 2012; Wendler, 2012). Little work however, has assessed the extent 
to which maturity models have been used to assess safety culture, as well as their 
scope and coverage. With this in mind, the specific aims of the review are: 
 
1. To provide a better understanding of how maturity models to assess safety 
culture have been developed; their conceptual underpinnings and roots; the 
range of safety domains in which they have been applied; and,  
characteristics of their use;   
2. To examine the methodological properties of maturity models to assess safety 
culture and the extent to which the outputs from using maturity models are 
evaluated (e.g., assessment of validity and reliability); 
3. To use the outcomes from the review to offer some reflections on the 
theoretical status of the use of maturity models to assess safety culture and 
suggest new directions for future research and practice. 
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3. Maturity models and safety culture 
3.1. Definition and scope 
Maturity models involve defining maturity stages or levels which assess the 
completeness of the analysed objects, usually organizations or processes, via 
different sets of multi-dimensional criteria (Wendler, 2012; Becker et al., 2009). 
Hudson (2007) defines the use of maturity models in safety culture in terms of a 
continuum ranging from organisations that have unsafe cultures (‘pathological’ 
organisations) through to those who manage safety proactively (‘generative’ 
organisations) and those who are an intermediate stage of development 
(‘bureaucratic’ organisations). Organisations are seen as progress sequentially 
through the stages, by building on the strengths and removing the weaknesses of 
the previous levels (Fleming, 2001). A maturity model is a descriptive model in 
the sense that it describes essential, or key, attributes that would be expected to 
characterize an organization at a particular level. 
  
The application of this concept is not limited to any particular domain (Wendler, 
2012) and maturity models can be used both as an assessment tool and as an 
improvement tool (Maier et al., 2012). Focus groups, interviews, audits and 
checklists support maturity models in safety culture as well as questionnaires. 
Assessment can be also structured around a matrix or grid, where levels of 
maturity are allocated against key aspects of performance or key activities, 
thereby creating a series of cells. An important feature of this maturity matrix 
approach is that the cells contain descriptive text for the characteristic traits of 
performance at each level. One stated advantage of the use of a maturity matrix 
is that it is less complex than diagnostic and improvement tools (Maier et al., 
2012). Based on the results of the analysis, recommendations for improvement 
measures can be derived and prioritized in order to reach higher maturity levels 
(Becker et al., 2009). 
 
3.2 Origins 
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The use of maturity models as a tool to assess safety culture can be traced back to 
two main roots, namely, previous work on the ‘Quality Management Maturity 
Grid’ and Westrum’s ‘Typology of Organisations’.  
 
 
3.2.1 Quality Management Maturity Grid 
The Quality Management Maturity Grid (QMMG) was first proposed by Philip 
Crosby in 1979 (Wendler, 2012). In the QMMG, Crosby advocated that 
organizations go through five successive stages of quality maturity as they 
approach the maximum level of quality in all phases of organizational activity, 
these are: uncertainty, awakening, enlightenment, wisdom and certainty. In the 
first stage, management has no comprehension of quality as a management tool. 
The intermediate stages are characterized by a transformation in management 
understanding and attitude towards quality, how quality appears within an 
organization, how organizational problems are handled, the cost of quality as a 
percentage of sales, quality improvement actions taken by management, and how 
management summarizes the organization’s quality problems. In the final stage 
of the QMMG, Total Quality Management (TQM) is viewed as an essential part 
of the company system (Calingo, 1996; Fraser et al., 2002). QMMG was adapted 
for process of building by the Carnegie-Mellon Software Engineering Institute 
(SEI) in 1986, where the concept of the Capability Maturity Model (CMM) was 
added and developed the foundation for its current use throughout industry 
(Paulk et al., 1993).  The CMM was designed to guide software organizations in 
selecting process improvement strategies by determining current process 
maturity and identifying the few issues most critical to software quality and 
process improvement. It has five levels: 
 
Initial: The software process is characterized as ad hoc, and occasionally even 
chaotic. Few processes are defined, and success depends on individual effort; 
Repeatable: Basic project management processes are established to track cost, 
schedule, and functionality. The necessary process discipline is in place to repeat 
earlier successes on projects with similar applications; 
Defined: The software process for both management and engineering activities is 
documented, standardized, and integrated into a standard software process for the 
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organization. All projects use an approved, tailored version of the organization's 
standard software process for developing and maintaining software;  
Managed: Detailed measures of the software process and product quality are 
collected. Both the software process and products are quantitatively understood 
and controlled; 
Optimising: Continuous process improvement is enabled by quantitative 
feedback from the process and from piloting innovative ideas and technologies. 
These five levels provide a framework for organizing these evolutionary steps 
into five maturity levels which are put forward as laying successive foundations 
for continuous process improvement (Paulk et al., 1993, figure 1). 
  
Figure 1 about here 
 
One of the first maturity model developed to assess safety was Dupont Bradley 
Curve which was examined by Fleming (2001) to develop a safety culture 
maturity model. The four stages in this model are: (i) reactive; (ii) dependent; 
(iii) independent; and, (iv) interdependent (Foster and Houst, 2013). In the first 
“reactive” stage people do not take responsibility. They believe that safety is 
more a matter of luck than management, and that “accidents will happen.” In a 
“dependent culture” there is an emphasis on management and supervisory 
control, with a heavy focus on written rules and procedures. An “independent 
culture” where the focus is on a personal commitment to and responsibility for 
safety. The final stage is “interdependent” where there is a team commitment to 
safety with everyone having a sense of responsibility for safety beyond their own 
work and by caring for the safety of others. 
 
3.2.2 Westrum’s typology of organisational cultures  
Typology of organisational was proposed by Ron Westrum (1993, 2004). 
Westrum’s model distinguished three types of organisation – pathological, 
bureaucratic and generative. Table 1 explains these categories and provides an 
example how their characteristics apply within organisations. This model was 
extended from three to five stages in sequence, replacing the label ‘bureaucratic’ 
with ‘calculative’ and introducing two extra stages, the reactive and the proactive 
stages (Hudson, 2001, 2007 - figure 2). This was done in order to allow for more 
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subtle and accurate classification, and at the same time increasing the 
accessibility of the framework to industry employees by including terms they 
would be familiar with (Parker et al., 2006). 
  
Table 1 and Figure 2 about here 
4. Method 
4.1 Search strategy and sources  
A literature search, including publications in academic journals, conference 
papers and grey literature covering the period January 2000 - January 2017 was 
carried out using the following electronic databases: Google Scholar, Science 
Direct, UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE), Web of Science, British Library, 
Open Grey (information on grey literature in Europe), ProQuest (dissertations 
and theses within the UK and Ireland), Canadian Centre for Occupational Health 
and Safety (CCOHS, include OSHLINE and NIOSHTIC), NIOSHTIC-2 and 
Occupational Safety and Health Resource Database.  
 
4.2 Search terms and exclusion/inclusion criteria 
The following search terms were used: ‘‘safety culture maturity’’, ‘‘safety 
culture maturity model’’, ‘‘safety culture AND maturity’’, ‘‘safety AND culture 
AND maturity’’, ‘‘framework and safety culture maturity’’, ‘‘safety culture 
maturity AND model’’. The reference sections and bibliographies of articles 
were also searched. When publications were not found directly from databases, 
the authors were contacted and copies of their articles were requested. The 
publications were filtered using a set of inclusion and exclusion criteria. 
Publications where the development of a maturity model was described as a tool 
to assess safety culture or presented an application of a maturity model were 
included within the review. Similarly, publications where the dimensions used to 
describe and assess safety culture were presented were included. Publications 
where actual development and/or application of a maturity model were not 
described were rejected, as were those written in languages other than English. 
 
4.3 Categorization framework 
In order to provide a structure for the review, we categorised publications using a 
framework made up of the following nine elements:  
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(1) Publication title, author(s) and year of publication;  
(2) Source (e.g., journal, thesis);  
(3) Country of origin;  
(4) Application domain;  
(5) Methods used to develop, evaluate and apply the model – this involved 
identification different methods used to develop, evaluate and apply the maturity 
model (e.g., questionnaire, interview, literature review and focus group); 
(6) Type of publication - in this case we made use of the distinction drawn by 
Wendler (2012) between: ‘maturity model development’ (defined as 
‘publications where the main objective was developing or constructing a new 
maturity model or adaptation of an existing maturity model’); ‘maturity model 
application’ (defined as ‘publications where the main aim is the application of 
maturity models in several contexts or specific domains’); ‘maturity model 
validation’ (defined as ‘publications where the main purpose is validating 
existing maturity models and includes empirical as well as conceptual validation, 
comparisons of maturity models and other approach and simulations’); and, 
‘maturity model reliability’ (defined as ‘publications where the main purpose is 
reliability testing of existing maturity models’); 
(7) Structure – this involved checking the structure of maturity models used in 
this study (e.g., number of level, description or summary of the characteristics of 
each level).  
(8) Level descriptor – this involved examining the different types of descriptors 
for the maturity levels used in the study sample (e.g., ‘pathological’, 
‘uncommitted’ and ‘amoral calculators’). 
(9) Aims and objectives of using the maturity model – this category was included 
in order to capture the main drivers or intentions for using the maturity model 
(e.g., assessing overall safety management or risk perceptions; assessing safety 
leadership).  In order to generate a set of codes which could be used to categorise 
the reasons for using the model, each author independently compiled a list of 
safety culture related keywords based on our individual reading of the study 
sample.  The authors then met and agreed upon a final set of 16 keywords; 
(10) Maturity model reliability and validity – this involved checking which of the 
study sample had carried out an assessment of mature model component 
reliability (e.g., by calculating values of internal reliability using Cronbach’s). 
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The different types of validity checked as well as validity testing are described in 
table 2. 
  
Table 2 about here 
 
5. Findings 
A total of 2026 publications were retrieved from the databases described in 
section 4.1. Duplicate publications were removed and a total of 135 (67 
publications in academic journals, 68 reports and other publications in grey 
literature) were selected by reading the title, abstract and key words. The 
remaining 135 publications were filtered out using the set of criteria, described in 
section 4.2. A total of 41 publications were selected using the criteria for detailed 
review. Twenty-two publications were in academic journals and the remaining 
19 were grey literature, including 5 reports. Ten publications were conference 
papers. In addition, the search yielded 4 theses (one PhD and three Masters 
Theses). Appendix A lists the complete set of review publications. Table 3 is 
summary of the results of applying the framework to the 41 studies.  In 
subsequent Sections of the paper, we refer to the studies with reference to their 
number in Table 3 (e.g., article 6 is Gordon et al., 2007).  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
5.1 Year of publication, country of origin and application domain 
In order to provide an overview of trends (e.g., growth, country of origin) in 
maturity models, the publications were analysed by their year of publication. The 
distribution over the last two decades (January 2000 - January 2017) is shown in 
Figure 3. Between 2000 and 2005, the number remained stable with at least one 
publication a year. Beginning in 2006, a steady rise is noticeable, reaching its 
peak with 7 publications in 2011. The country which published the most on 
maturity models was the United Kingdom with 8 publications (1, 8, 9, 12, 16, 24, 
27 and 31) followed by Canada with 7 publications (3, 5, 7, 15, 18, 34 and 39). 
One maturity model was applied in two countries, Canada and United Kingdom 
(Kirk et al., 2007, 8). 
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Figure 3 about here 
 
There is fairly uniform application across a range of domains, but the trends 
indicate areas of recent growth in the healthcare (3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 18, 20, 38, 39 and 
41), oil and gas (1, 12, 13, 24, 26, 27, 28, 34 and 35) and the construction 
industry (10, 11, 25, 30, 31 and 37). 
 
5.2 Methods used to develop, evaluate and apply the maturity model  
A wide variety of methods were used in order to develop, evaluate and apply the 
maturity models in the sample (table 4). Accordingly, the most used method (30 
in total) was where the developer sought information from previous literature in 
order to develop the maturity models. Some studies (1, 4, 5, 8, 12, 14, 15, 19, 31, 
32 and 34) used literature mixed with other development methods, e.g., Parker et 
al., (2006, 1) used literature and interview and Kirk at al., (2007, 8) used 
literature review, interview and consultation with experts (where safety and risk 
management experts are consulted for comments and opinion on maturity model 
by developer).  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
Questionnaires were the most common method used to evaluate and apply the 
maturity model. Four publications used comparison to evaluate the maturity 
model, e.g., Gordon et al., (2007, 6) presented 2 maturity models, one maturity 
model to assess a safety culture by questionnaire and one to assess the safety 
culture by interview and both maturity models were evaluated their results by 
comparison. A combination of two or more methods (e.g., interviews and 
questionnaires), was used to apply 7 maturity models. Tappin et al, (2015, 2) for 
example, used semi-structured interviews combined with documentary analysis 
of occupational safety and health (OSH) systems in order to assess OSH maturity 
levels. 
 
5.3 Type of publication  
Table 5 shows the distribution of the four types of publications among the 
sample. Maturity model development is the most common type of publication 
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(33 out of 41), whereas the number of publication of maturity model application 
(4 out of 41), validation (2 out of 41) and reliability (2 out of 41) was smaller.  
 
Table 5 about here 
5.4 Structure  
The maturity models have a conceptual overlap, such as aspect at discrete stages 
or maturity levels, with a description of characteristic performance at various 
levels of maturity. The following structure is common in maturity models to 
assess safety culture: (a) a number of levels (typically 5); (b) a descriptor for 
each level which are describe following section 5.5; (c) a generic description or 
summary of the characteristics of each level as a whole; (d) multi-dimensional; 
and, (f) a description of each activity as it might be performed at each maturity 
level. 
 
5.5 Level descriptor  
More than two-thirds of maturity models (68%, n=28) were developed based on 
Westrum’s model and adopted pathological, reactive, calculative or bureaucratic, 
proactive, and generative or sustainable levels (table 6). Filho et al., (2010, 13) 
relabelled ‘generative’ as ‘sustainable’ in order to make it more understandable 
in their country. The ‘bureaucratic’ level was also retained in maturity models 
developed by Law et al., (2010, 3) and Filho et al., (2010, 13).  Six maturity 
models were developed based on the CMM and adopted ‘emerging’, ‘managing’, 
‘involving’, ‘cooperating’ and ‘continually improving’ levels. Eight maturity 
models adopted different levels from Westrum’s model and CMM. Wright et al., 
(2012, 16) adopted the levels ‘amoral calculators’, ‘dependent’, ‘doubters’, 
‘proactive compliers’ and ‘leader’ because these labels were seen as more 
suitable for the domain of food safety.  Similarly, Jespersen (2016, 5) adopted the 
levels ‘doubt’, ‘react’, ‘know’, ‘predict’ and ‘internalize’ in their models. The 
maturity model developed by Lunt et al., (2011, 31) combined elements of the 
Westrum model and CMM in order to make it more suitable for use in the 
construction industry. Consequently, the names for each level were changed to 
‘starting blocks’, ‘getting going’, ‘walking’, ‘running’ and ‘sprinting’, 
respectively. 
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Table 6 about here 
 
Gordon et al., (2007) developed two maturity models in same publication (6), 
one based on CMM (6A) and other one based on the DNV (Det Norske Veritas) 
auditing system in which the levels adopted were ‘uncertainty’, ‘core’, 
‘extended’, ‘leading edge’ and ‘world class’ (6B). Fleming and Meakin (2004, 
15) adapted the maturity model from the model presented in the ‘Changing 
Minds’ toolkit (Step Change in Safety, 2017). Their model includes the 
following levels: ‘documenting’, ‘controlling’, ‘engaging’, ‘participating’ and 
‘institutionalising’.  Mohamed and Chinda (2010,10) adopted the EFQM 
(European Foundation for Quality Management) Excellence model, 
consequently, their maturity model includes the following levels: ‘uncommitted’, 
‘drifters’, ‘improvers’, ‘award winners’, and ‘world-class’. 
 
5.6 Aims and objectives of using the maturity model 
The most common aim was general safety management assessment, which 
appeared in 33 (80%) publications followed by assessment of communication 
about safety (68%), management commitment to safety (68%) and safety training 
(66%).  Assessing organisational learning accounted for more than half of the 
publications in our sample (56%), whilst accident/incident reporting (37%), 
safety prioritisation (37%), employee involvement (34%) and accident/incident 
analysis (34%) made up more than a third of the publications. Organisational 
trust (22%), safety audit (22%), periodic review (20%) represented 
approximately a fifth of the sample, followed by a smaller proportion of 
publications which focused on  risk perceptions (17%),  risk analysis (15%) 
safety leadership (15%)  and work pressure (12%). 
 
5.7 Maturity model reliability and validity  
The 41 publications were specifically checked regarding evidence in terms of the 
assessment of reliability and validity were carried out (table 7). Eleven (27%) 
studies carried out some form of reliability assessment (e.g., where a maturity 
model had involved a questionnaire and assessed reliability using Cronbach’s 
Alpha). Fourteen (34%) publications carried out both content validity (e.g., by 
assessing how close the maturity model aligned with other measures or indices of 
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safety such as an employee safety culture perception survey) and face validity 
(e.g., by asking employees to assess the extent to which the components of the 
model mapped on to aspects of safety in their organisation). Four publications 
carried out convergent validity (i.e., testing whether maturity model components 
supposed to be either related or unrelated, in fact, related or unrelated – 
Campbell and Fiske, 1959) and two carried out discriminant validity. Only one 
study (34) provided evidence about the procedure used to assess reliability and 
all four types of validity. Eighteen (44%) of the publications report no evidence 
that assessments of either reliability or validity were carried out. 
 
Table 7 about here 
 
6. Discussion 
6.1. Growth and expansion of maturity models 
Our findings demonstrate that over the last two decades there has been a steady 
growth in the use of maturity models to assess safety culture across a wide range 
of industries. The period 2008-2011 represents a peak of activity in using 
maturity models with steady use characterising the succeeding years (figure 3). 
Similarly, articles drawn from the Anglophone countries are the most frequent 
ones using maturity models, but with some evidence that their use is consistently 
wide in terms of other countries and global regions. In terms of application 
domain, construction, oil and gas and healthcare are the most common areas in 
which maturity models are applied. To some extent this might be explained by 
the fact that industries such as oil and gas have a well-established track record in 
using specific type of models and developing tools which have influenced other 
attempts to use maturity models (e.g., the Hearts and Minds toolkit – Hudson and 
Willekes, 2000). Likewise, the growth of maturity models in the healthcare 
sector might be attributable to the popularity of the Manchester Patient Safety 
Framework (MaPSaF) and its promotion up until 2012 within the UK by bodies 
such as the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA), alongside other trends such 
as increased efforts to assess patient safety culture and drives to accelerate the 
integration of human factors within healthcare (Waterson, 2014; Waterson and 
Catchpole, 2016). Figure 4 illustrates the growth of specific types of tools 
associated with maturity models since the beginning of the millennium, as well 
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as application domains in which they are used and links back to earlier work in 
the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s (section 3.2). 
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
 
6.2 The theoretical status of maturity models 
6.2.1 Maturity models as tools for organizational development 
The range of methods used to develop, evaluate and apply maturity models, 
alongside the finding that most of the publications in the review sample fall into 
‘development’ (i.e., where the main objective was to build a maturity model, 
rather than necessarily describe its application or evaluation - Wendler, 2012), 
would seem to provide some evidence maturity models illustrate what 
Guldenmund’s (2010, 2016) characterized as a ‘pragmatic or experience-based’ 
approach with regard to safety culture. This ‘pragmatism’ extends to numerous 
attempts which were made to change the various elements of the maturity models 
and the variety of level descriptors used within the study sample (table 6). 
Similarly, the fact that the main driver for using the model in most of our sample 
was assessment of general levels of safety and core elements of safety culture 
(e.g., communication, management commitment) as opposed to detailed aspects 
(e.g., levels of organizational trust, risk perceptions) might be seen to imply that 
maturity models are seen as ways of assessing the ‘wider, bigger picture’ of how 
safety might work in a specific organizational culture (c.f., ‘total safety culture’ - 
Geller, 1994). Finally, the low numbers of studies which report details of 
reliability and validity, might be seen to imply that the ‘process’ of using a 
maturity model is more important that the actual ‘outcome’.  From this point of 
view, maturity models might be construed as tools for ‘organizational 
development’, as compared to a means of ‘measuring’ safety culture, again 
reinforcing their ‘pragmatic ‘advantages as compared to survey instruments 
(‘analytical/psychological’ approaches – Guldenmund, 2010; 2016;, ‘culture as 
causal attitude’ – Silbey, 2009) and qualitative methods such as interviews or 
ethnographies (‘interpretive/anthropological’  approaches Guldenmund, 2010; 
2016; ‘culture as emergent/indeterminate’ – Silbey, 2009). 
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6.2.2 Static vs. dynamic accounts of safety culture 
Aside from the resource-intensive drawbacks (i.e., the time taken to organise 
discussion groups or workshops and analyse/evaluate results) of using maturity 
models, it may also be the case that maturity models may encourage a misleading 
picture of how safety culture operates in organisations. Maturity models imply 
that organisations make steady progress on a journey that takes them from low 
levels of safety towards an optimal state. This might in some ways be interpreted 
as a ‘Whig-like’ interpretation of cultural improvement2, when in reality values 
and beliefs held by employees about safety may spontaneously wax, wane and in 
some cases relapse over short periods of time (Turner, 1978; Busch, 2016). 
Vincent and Amalberti (2016) for example, refer to safety as a ‘moving target’ as 
opposed to a fixed entity. Maturity models by their very nature may tend to 
overemphasise aspects of a static view of safety and may underplay the subtlety 
with which safety may dynamically vary according to a host of influencing 
factors (resources, workload, policy changes, economic and political influences – 
Rasmussen, 1997). Internal /external benchmarking of the outcomes of safety 
culture assessment may also play to hidden agendas within organisations and 
potential lead to manipulation and ‘gaming’ (e.g., the misuse of safety culture in 
‘league tables’ - Shorrock, personal communication).  
 
6.2.3 The absence of theory in maturity models 
In common with other well-known frequently used constructs in safety science 
and human factors (e.g., the systems approach - Waterson, 2009), we found few 
attempts within our review sample to articulate what type of theory of safety 
culture was being used. Authors tended to offer a definition of safety culture, but 
made few attempts to link their work to theoretical frameworks and approaches 
which are common within safety science and human factors (e.g., the theory of 
High Reliability Organization (HRO) – Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007; Normal 
Accident Theory – Perrow, 1984). In many ways this criticism might be levelled 
at much of the literature on safety culture (Flin, 2007; Reiman and Rollenhagen, 
2014), however the use of maturity models appears to imply that there is some 
mechanism underlying improvement and that particular components of cultural 
                                            
2 The term ‘Whig’ refers to a 17th Century political faction. A Whig view of history presents the 
past as an inevitable progression towards ever greater liberty and enlightenment.  
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development (e.g., ‘pathological’ or ‘bureaucratic’ states, stages of phases) 
which either predicts the nature and course of improvement or set out a steps on 
the road to improvement. In the absence of a theoretical basis it is difficult to see 
how this can be justified. Theories by their very nature are used to predict 
behavior and levels of safety, as well as supporting comparison with other, 
sometimes unrelated, phenomena (so-called ‘disciplined imagination – Weick, 
1989).  Sutton and Shaw (1995) point to a number of misunderstandings about 
the use of theory in the social sciences including the view that data on its own 
does not constitute a contribution to theory. In many respects the findings from 
our review suggest that using a maturity model and reporting the outcomes from 
this use, does not in itself constitute a theory of safety. Studies which report the 
use of maturity models need to be more explicit in stating the type of theoretical 
stance (e.g., epistemology, ontology – Haavik, 2014) they are adopting and move 
away from a non-committal approach towards theory. Part of this involves 
providing more details of the process of change and the mechanisms which 
underpin safety improvement.   
 
6.3. Maturity models –academic and practitioner perspectives 
6.3.1 Maturity models as a ‘cool medium’ 
In many respects the findings from our review of the use of maturity models to 
assess safety culture also touch on a number of debates which have surrounded 
safety culture, as well as the assessment of work-based attitudes and the wider 
world of safety over the past few decades. Many of these debates are framed in 
terms of binary distinctions and opposing positions. Wilson (1987) provides a 
typical example in his account of the various methods (e.g., questionnaire 
instruments, semi-structured discussions with employees) which are used to 
assess job attitudes and inform job redesign decisions.  This time drawing on the 
work of Marshall McLuhan (1964), Wilson argues that ‘formal job attitude 
instruments used alone are 'hot media', in the sense of being well-filled with data 
but low in participation. Informal discussion methods could be seen then as a 
'cool medium', high in participation or completion by the audience’ (Wilson, 
1987, p. 385). Wilson further argues that informal methods can encourage 
employees to develop ‘ownership’ of the outcomes from discussions and 
workshops (Shipley, 1987) as well as providing detailed insights into the reasons 
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why particular attitudes may be shared or dominant at one particular time. It 
might be argued that maturity models, as compared to other methods of 
measuring safety culture (e.g., questionnaires) fall under Wilson’s category of 
‘cool media’ and a similar set of trade-offs may be at play (e.g., promoting 
participation as compared to providing more scientific or ‘objective’ measures of 
safety culture). In some cases, it may be that from the safety practitioner’s point 
of view it may be that in using a maturity the process may be more important that 
the actual outcome. How practitioners use maturity models, their goals and what 
they do with the results is something, alongside other aspects of the day-to-day 
work of the safety professionals, which is worthy of further attention (Hale, 
2006). 
 
6.3.2 Flexibility and ‘bricolage’ 
An additional strength of maturity models might be said to be the fact that they 
are flexible and can be tailored to fit the specific requirements and objectives of 
organisations and their employees. Our findings as they relate to level descriptors 
for example (table 6), show that the types of maturity models used to assess 
safety culture varied a great deal.  This flexibility and adaptability is in many 
ways similar to other methods within safety science (e.g., Rasmussen’s work on 
the Accimap method of accident analysis and subsequent attempts to ‘remix’ his 
work – Waterson et al., 2017). This process might be seen as akin to what the 
anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss (1966) called ‘bricolage’, that is ‘the 
construction [e.g., an artefact, narrative, tool] or creation from a diverse range 
of available things’ (Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 12th Edition, 2011). 
The process of bricolage is also very much in keeping with the pragmatic 
approach towards safety culture assessment. 
 
7. Conclusions, limitations and future work 
In this paper we have attempted to review published literature which has made 
use of maturity models of one sort or another to assess safety culture over the last 
two decades or so. Our findings show on the one hand growth in terms of the use 
of maturity models to assess safety culture, but also significant variation in the 
ways in which they are used and reported within the literature. A key limitation 
of our work, which was difficult to avoid, is that we focused on published 
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research. Anecdotal evidence suggests that use of maturity models may be under-
reported. Our work in a variety of sectors (e.g., oil and gas, healthcare) suggests 
that maturity models are widely used by organisations eager to gain some insight 
into their safety culture. Much of this activity might be characterised as 
‘experimenting’ with maturity models, particularly as a result of disappointing 
efforts using other methods for measuring safety culture (e.g., low response rates 
from questionnaire studies). Many of these ‘experiments’ appear as internal 
reports or other forms of informal feedback within these organisations and hence 
do not appear in published form. Maturity models, we would argue, focus on the 
process aspects of safety culture and in line with other areas of safety science 
there is a need for more case study or ‘experienced-based’ accounts of how they 
are used and what sorts of organisational outcomes arise from their usage and 
how this might change and develop over time (Hale, 2006): 
 
‘Maturity scales … represent the steps leading from the pathological state or 
face to the smiling, generative one, but we know little or nothing about whether it 
is indeed possible to mount that scale, and if so how. We have not defined 
whether we should be trying to shift companies all the way from one to another 
end of the scale, or that we would be happy if the bulk of companies made it to 
the halfway point and became ‘calculative’. Longitudinal research studies of 
companies to plot such shifts and how to facilitate them are desperately needed. 
We might also need to expand our discipline base to do it.’ (Hale, 2006) 
 
In terms of the practice of safety culture assessment, would also argue that the 
decision to use a maturity model to assess safety culture instead of other type of 
methods (e.g., focus groups, questionnaire surveys), should not be seen in terms 
of a straightforward question of either/or. Rather, we would encourage potential 
users of maturity models to view them pragmatically and to acknowledge the 
value of using them in combination with other methods (see for example Kirwan 
and Shorrock, 2014, for a case study description of how this applies). Finally, the 
strengths and weaknesses of maturity models and their application within the 
field of safety culture needs to be more widely acknowledged (e.g., compromises 
and trade-offs - Waterson et al., 2014; Amalberti, 2013).  
 
From an academic or scientific point-of-view we would argue for greater 
attention be given to the theoretical aspects and justification for using maturity 
models. As noted in section 6.2.3 we would also suggest, in common with many 
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other authors, that more attention to theory is also a need for the field of safety 
culture more widely. The findings from our review showed that assessments of 
the reliability and validity of the use of maturity models to assess safety culture 
tend to be the exception, rather than the rule (44% of the sample did not report 
any evidence of reliability or validity assessments). A key weakness of the 
maturity model approach may be that results obtained during one point in time 
may not prove to be repeatable during another. The studies in our sample do not 
allow us to draw firm conclusions about the reliability, validity and overall 
robustness of using maturity models. Further investigation probing deeper into 
these factors is likely to be one area for future research. It seems likely however, 
that discussion of focus groups with different groups and/or members are 
unlikely to produce outcomes which are difficult to compare and hence very 
difficult to assess in terms of reliability.  
 
We should also acknowledge, as mentioned in section 6.2 of the paper, that the 
flexibility afforded by maturity models may be a strength rather than a weakness 
as compared to other methods of safety culture assessment. We note in passing, 
however, that the reliability and validity of other types of maturity model has 
been the subject of some debate in the last few years (e.g., Bach’s criticism of the 
Capability Maturity Model – Bach, 1994; Finkelstein, 1992). The question of 
validity (e.g., how well do maturity assessments correlate with safety outcome 
data) is however, possible to assess and, in common with other types of safety 
culture assessment (Flin et al., 2000), is something that should be pursued in the 
future, at least for those organisations (e.g., those who did carry out 
validity/reliability assessment) who wish to pursue this goal. In conclusion, we 
would say that our understanding of the scientific and practice-oriented aspects 
of maturity models remains relatively ‘immature’. Much more effort needs to be 
given over in the future to some of the gaps in our current understanding which 
have been revealed by our literature review. 
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Table 1: Typology of organisation cultures (adapted from Westrum, 2004) 
 
Typology of 
organisation 
Characteristic Example 
Pathological Preoccupation with personal power, 
needs, and glory 
Information is hidden, messengers are “shot”, responsibilities are shirked, bridging is discouraged, failure is 
covered up, new ideas are actively crushed     
Bureaucratic Preoccupation with rules, positions, 
and ‘departmental turf’ 
Information may be ignored, messengers are tolerated, responsibility is compartmentalised, bridging is 
allowed but neglected, organisation is just and merciful, new ideas create problems 
Generative Concentration on the mission itself, 
as opposed to a concentration on 
people or positions 
Information is actively sought, messengers are trained, responsibilities are shared, bridging is rewarded, 
failure causes inquiry, new ideas are welcomed 
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Table 2: Types of validity and testing (Trochim, 2006) 
 
Type of validity Definition Testing 
Face Refers to the degree to which a measurement tool subjectively 
appears to measure the construct that it is supposed to measure 
(e.g., safety culture). In other words, face validity is when a 
measurement appears to do what it claims to do. 
To assess the face validity of a safety culture measure, it would 
be sent the measure to a carefully selected sample of experts on 
safety culture measure and they all reported back with the 
judgment that the measure appears to be a good measure of 
safety culture. 
Content Refers to how accurately a measurement tool taps into the various 
aspects of the specific construct in question (e.g., safety culture). 
In other words, do the questions really measure the construct in 
question. 
If a particular measurement tool is designed to measure safety 
culture, a group of experts on safety culture would evaluate 
each dimension chosen to measure safety culture and provide 
an opinion on how well each dimension taps into measuring of 
safety culture. 
Convergent Examines the degree to which a measurement is similar to 
(converges on) another measurement that it theoretically should 
be similar to. 
Measurement tool should be able to show a correspondence or 
convergence between similar safety culture. 
Discriminant Examine the degree to which measurement is not similar to 
(diverges from) another measurement that it theoretically should 
be not be similar to. 
Measurement tool should be able to discriminate between 
dissimilar safety culture. 
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Table 3: Applying the categorisation framework  
 
Title/Author Source Country 
of origin 
Domain Method 
 
 
 
Type of 
publication 
(Wendler, 2012) 
Level descriptor 
D E A D A V R 
1. A framework for understanding the 
development of organisational safety culture 
Parker, D., Lawrie, M.  and Hudson, P. (2006) 
Safety Science United 
Kingdom 
Oil and gas Literature 
review and 
interview 
Focus group Questionnaire 
or matrix 
X    Level 1: Pathological 
Level 2: Reactive 
Level 3: Calculative 
Level 4: Proactive 
Level 5: Generative 
2. An implementation evaluation of a qualitative 
culture assessment tool 
Tappin, D. C.,  Bentley, T. A. and  Ashby, L. E. 
(2015) 
Applied 
Ergonomics 
New 
Zealand 
Non-specific 
domain 
Literature 
review 
Interview and 
documental 
analysis 
Interview  and 
documental 
analysis 
X    Level 1: Pathological 
Level 2: Reactive 
Level 3: Calculative 
Level 4: Proactive 
Level 5: Generative 
3. Assessment of Safety Culture 
Law, M. P.,  Zimmerman, R.,   Baker, G. R., 
and Smith, T. (2010) 
Healthcare 
Quarterly 
Canada Healthcare Questionnaire Questionnaire Questionnaire X    Level 1: Pathological 
Level 2: Reactive 
Level 3: Bureaucratic 
Level 4: Proactive 
Level 5: Generative 
4. Assessing patient safety culture in New 
Zealand primary care: a pilot study using a 
modified Manchester Patient Safety 
Framework in Dunedin general practices 
Wallis, K. and  Dovey, S. (2011) 
Journal of 
Primary Health 
Care 
New 
Zealand 
Healthcare Literature 
review and 
meeting group 
Not reported Matrix and 
work group 
X    Level A 
Level B 
Level C 
Level D 
Level E 
5. Measurement of food safety culture using 
survey and maturity profiling tools 
Jespersen, L., Griffiths, M., Maclaurin, T., 
Chapman, B. and Wallace, C. A. (2016) 
Food Control Canada Food Literature 
review and 
consultation 
with expert  
Questionnaire Questionnaire X    Level 1: Doubt 
Level 2: React 
Level 3: Know 
Level 4: Predict 
Level 5: Internalize 
6A. Measuring safety culture in a research and 
development centre: A comparison of two 
methods in the Air Traffic Management domain 
Gordon, R., Kirwan, B. and Perrin, E. (2007) 
Safety Science France Air traffic control Literature 
review 
Questionnaire Questionnaire X    Level 1: Emerging 
Level 2: Managing 
Level 3: Involving 
Level 4: Cooperating 
Level 5: Continually 
improve 
6B. Measuring safety culture in a research and 
development centre: A comparison of two 
methods in the Air Traffic Management domain 
Gordon, R., Kirwan, B. and Perrin, E. (2007) 
Safety Science France Air traffic control Literature 
review 
Interview Interview X    Level 1: Uncertainty 
Level 2: Core 
Level 3: Extended 
Level 4: Leading Edge 
Level 5: World Class 
Note: D= Development E= Evaluation   A=application V= Validity R= Reliability 
Table 3: Applying the categorisation framework (cont.) 
 
Title/Author Source Country 
of origin 
Domain Method 
 
 
 
Type of 
publication 
(Wendler, 2012) 
Level descriptor 
D E A D A V R 
7. Patient Safety Culture Improvement Tool: 
Development and Guidelines for Use 
Fleming, M. and Wentzell, N. (2008) 
Healthcare 
Quarterly 
Canada Healthcare Literature 
review 
Interview  Matrix X    Level 0: Pathological 
Level 1: Reactive 
Level 2: Calculative 
Level 3: Proactive 
Level 4: Generative 
8. Patient safety culture in primary care: 
developing a theoretical framework for 
practical use 
Kirk, S., Parker, D., Claridge, T., Esmail, A. 
and  Marshall, M. (2007) 
Quality and 
Safety in Health 
Care 
United 
Kingdom 
Healthcare Literature 
review, 
consultation 
with expertise 
and interview 
Interview and 
focus group 
Matrix X    Level 1: Pathological 
Level 2: Reactive 
Level 3: Calculative 
Level 4: Proactive 
Level 5: Generative 
9. Safety culture assessment in community 
pharmacy: development, face validity, and 
feasibility of the Manchester Patient Safety 
Assessment Framework 
Ashcroft, D. M., Morecroft, C., Parker, D. and 
Noyce, P. R. (2005) 
Quality and 
Safety in Health 
Care 
United 
Kingdom 
Healthcare Focus group  Focus group Matrix  X    Level 1: Pathological 
Level 2: Reactive 
Level 3: Calculative 
Level 4: Proactive 
Level 5: Generative 
10. System dynamics modelling of construction 
safety culture 
Mohamed, S. and Chinda, T. (2010) 
Engineering, 
Construction 
and 
Architectural 
Management 
Thailand Construction Literature 
review  
No reported Questionnaire X    Level 1:Uncommitted 
Level 2: Drifters 
Level 3: Improvers 
Level 4: Award winners  
Level 5: World Class 
11. Research on the Maturity of Real Estate 
Enterprises Safety Culture 
Zhang, F., Zhang, Y., Liu, J. and Luo, H. (2013) 
Journal of 
Applied 
Sciences 
China Construction Literature 
review 
Not reported Questionnaire X    Level 1: Emerging 
Level 2: Managing 
Level 3: Involving 
Level 4: Cooperating 
Level 5: Continually 
improve 
12. Safety culture maturity model 
Fleming, M. (2001) 
Offshore 
technology 
report n. 
2000/049 for 
Health and 
Safety 
Executive 
United 
Kingdom 
Oil and gas Literature 
review and 
focus group 
Interview  No reported X    Level 1: Emerging 
Level 2: Managing 
Level 3: Involving 
Level 4: Cooperating 
Level 5: Continually 
improve 
13. A safety culture maturity model for 
petrochemical companies in Brazil  
Goncalves Filho, A. P., Andrade, J. C. S. and 
Marinho, M.M.O. (2010) 
Safety Science Brazil Oil and gas Literature 
review 
Interview and 
questionnaire 
Questionnaire X    Level 1: Pathological 
Level 2: Reactive 
Level 3: Bureaucratic 
Level 4: Proactive 
Level 5: Generative 
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Table 3: Applying the categorisation framework (cont.) 
 
 
Title/Author Source Country 
of origin 
Domain Method 
 
 
 
Type of 
publication 
(Wendler, 
2012) 
Level descriptor 
D E A D A V R 
14. Incorporating organisational safety culture 
within ergonomics practice 
Bentleya, T. and Tappin, D. (2010) 
Ergonomics New 
Zealand 
Utilities company Literature 
review, 
interview and 
documental 
analysis 
Not reported Interview and 
documental 
analysis  
X    Level 1: Pathological 
Level 2: Reactive 
Level 3: Calculative 
Level 4: Proactive 
Level 5: Generative 
15. Cultural Maturity Model: Health and Safety 
Improvement through Involvement 
Fleming, M. and Meakin, S. (2004) 
The Seventh 
SPE 
International 
Conference 
Calgary, 
Alberta, Canada 
Canada Non-specific 
domain 
Literature and 
consultation 
with experts 
Workshop Matrix X    Level 1: Documenting 
Level 2: Controlling 
Level 3: Engaging 
Level 4: Participating  
Level 5:Institutionalising 
16. A Tool to Diagnose Culture in Food 
Business Operators 
Wright, M., Leach, P. and Palmer, G. (2012) 
Report from 
Greenstreet 
Berman Ltd for 
the Food 
Standards 
Agency, 
Reference GSB 
CL2567 R1 V6 
FCA 
United 
Kingdom 
Food Literature 
review 
Not reported Documental 
analysis and 
observation 
X    Level 1: Amoral 
calculators 
Level 2: Dependent 
Level 3: Doubters 
Level 4: Proactive 
compliers 
Level 5: Leaders 
17. Enterprise development through the safety 
culture 
Phusavat, K., Vongvitayapirom, B. and 
Hidayanto, A. N. (2015) 
International 
Journal of 
Management 
and Enterprise 
Development 
Thailand Non-specific 
domain 
Literature 
review, 
consultation 
with experts, 
documental 
analyses and 
questionnaire 
Questionnaire 
and consultation 
with expert  
Questionnaire  X   Level 1: Pathological 
Level 2: Reactive 
Level 3: Calculative 
Level 4: Proactive 
Level 5: Generative 
18. Understanding Safety Culture in Long-
Term Care: A Case Study 
Halligan, M.H., Zecevic, A., Kothari, A.R., 
Salmoni, A. W. and  Orchard, T. (2014) 
Journal Patient 
Safety 
Canada Healthcare Application of 
the maturity 
model 
developed in 
Publication 7 
See Publication 
number 7 
Interview, 
Focus group 
and 
questionnaire 
X    Level 1: Pathological 
Level 2: Reactive 
Level 3: Calculative 
Level 4: Proactive 
Level 5: Generative 
19. Qualitative evaluation of a framework for 
understanding the development of 
organisational safety culture 
Bentleya, T., and Tappin, D. (2008) 
The Journal of 
Occupational 
Health and 
Safety Australia 
and New 
Zealand 
New 
Zealand 
Utilities company Literature 
review, 
interview and 
documental 
analysis 
Not reported Interview; focus 
group and 
documental 
analysis 
X    Level 1: Pathological 
Level 2: Reactive 
Level 3: Calculative 
Level 4: Proactive 
Level 5: Generative 
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Table 3: Applying the categorisation framework (cont.) 
 
 
Title/Author Source Country Domain Method Type of Level descriptor 
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Table 3: Applying the categorisation framework (cont.) 
 
Title/Author Source Country 
of origin 
Domain Method 
 
 
Type of 
publication 
(Wendler, 
Level descriptor 
of origin  
 
 
publication 
(Wendler, 
2012) 
D E A D A V R 
20. Patient safety dialogue: Evaluation of an 
intervention aimed at achieving an improved 
patient safety culture 
Ohrn, A., Rutberg, H. and  Nilsen, P. (2011) 
 
Journal of Patient 
Safety 
Sweden Healthcare Literature 
review 
Not reported Interview and 
documental 
analysis 
X    Level 1: Pathological 
Level 2: Reactive 
Level 3: Calculative 
Level 4: Proactive 
Level 5: Generative 
21. A preliminary study on safety culture 
maturity model of Chinese coal mine 
Xu, W. and Pan, J.  (2011) 
Proceedings of 
2011 International 
Conference on 
Management 
Science and 
Intelligent Control  
China Coal mining Literature 
review 
Not reported Not reported X    Level 1: Initial 
Level 2: Managed 
Level 3: Preventive 
Level 4: Matured 
Level 5: Optimized 
22. Development of safety culture assessment 
model using safety culture maturity model and 
4P-4C matrix 
Sheen, C. and Chung, DW. (2011) 
Proceedings of 
2011 International 
Topical Meeting 
on Probabilistic 
Safety 
Assessment and 
Analysis 
South 
Korea 
Nuclear power  Literature 
review 
Not reported Not reported X    Level 1: Pathological 
Level 2: Reactive 
Level 3: Calculative 
Level 4: Proactive 
Level 5: Generative 
23. Application of Safety Maturity Model and 
4P-4C Model in Safety Culture Assessment 
Choi, K.S., Lee, Y.E., Ha, J. T., Chang, H. S. 
and Kam, S. C. (2010) 
Transactions of 
the Korean 
Nuclear Society 
Autumn Meeting 
South 
Korea 
Nuclear power  Literature 
Review 
Not reported Not reported X    Level 1: Pathological 
Level 2: Reactive 
Level 3: Calculative 
Level 4: Proactive 
Level 5: Generative 
24. Towards a mature safety culture 
Lardner, R., Fleming, M. and Joyner, P. (2001) 
Symposium series 
n. 148 of the 
Institution of 
Chemical 
Engineers 
United 
Kingdom 
Oil and gas Application of 
the maturity 
model 
developed in 
Publication 12 
See Publication 
number 12 
Workshop  X   Level 1: Emerging 
Level 2: Managing 
Level 3: Involving 
Level 4: Cooperating 
Level 5: Continually 
improve 
25. Health and Safety Culture 
Lingard, H., Zhang, R., Harley, J., Blismas, N. 
and Wakefield, R. (2014) 
Report 2014 of 
the RMIT 
University - 
Centre for 
Construction 
Work Health and 
Safety Research 
Australia Construction Literature 
review 
Not reported Not reported 
X    
Level 1: Pathological 
Level 2: Reactive 
Level 3: Calculative 
Level 4: Proactive 
Level 5: Generative 
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 2012) 
D E A D A V R 
26. Safety Culture Maturity and Risk 
Management Maturity in Industrial 
Organizations 
Goncalves, A. P., Kanegae, G. and Leite, G. 
(2012) 
XVIII 
International 
Conference on 
Industrial 
Engineering and 
Operations 
Management 
Brazil Oil and gas, 
footwear 
Manufacturing 
and infrastruture 
Application of 
the maturity 
model 
developed in 
Publication 13 
See Publication 
number 13 
Questionnaire 
 X   
Level 1: Pathological 
Level 2: Reactive 
Level 3: Bureaucratic 
Level 4: Proactive 
Level 5: Generative 
27. Investigating employee perceptions of a 
framework of safety culture maturity 
Lawrie, M., Parker, D. and Hudson, P. (2006) 
Safety Science United 
Kingdom 
Oil and gas Application of 
the maturity 
model 
developed in 
publication 1 
Questionnaire See Publication 
number 1 
   X 
Level 1: Pathological 
Level 2: Reactive 
Level 3: Calculative 
Level 4: Proactive 
Level 5: Generative 
28. Lessons Learned from Applying Safety 
Culture Maturity Model in Thailand 
Vongvitayapirom, B., Sachakamol, P., Kropsu-
Vehkapera, H. and Kess, P. (2013) 
International 
Journal of 
Synergy and 
Research 
Thailand Oil and gas Literature 
review 
Questionnaire Questionnaire 
X    
Level 1: Pathological 
Level 2: Reactive 
Level 3: Calculative 
Level 4: Proactive 
Level 5: Generative 
29. A Framework for Assessing Safety Culture 
Gotivall, J. (2014) 
Master’s thesis 
in Chemical 
Engineering  
University of 
Technology 
Gothenburg  
Sweden Non-specific 
domain 
Literature 
review 
Accident 
analysis 
Not reported 
X    
Level 1: Pathological 
Level 2: Reactive 
Level 3: Calculative 
Level 4: Proactive 
Level 5: Generative 
29. A Framework for Assessing Safety Culture 
Gotivall, J. (2014) 
Master’s thesis 
in Chemical 
Engineering  
University of 
Technology 
Gothenburg  
Sweden Non-specific 
domain 
Literature 
review 
Accident 
analysis 
Not reported 
X    
Level 1: Pathological 
Level 2: Reactive 
Level 3: Calculative 
Level 4: Proactive 
Level 5: Generative 
30. Criteria for the Development of a Safety 
Culture Maturity Model for the Construction 
Industry 
McGeorge, D., Sunindijo, R.Y., Zou, P.X.W. 
(2011) 
Proceedings of 
the International 
Symposium on 
Information 
Technologies in 
Safety 
Management of 
Large Scale 
Infrastructure 
Projects  
Australia Construction Literature 
review 
Not reported Questionnaire 
X    
Level 1: Emerging 
Level 2: Managing 
Level 3: Involving 
Level 4: Cooperating 
Level 5: Continually 
improve 
Table 3: Applying the categorisation framework (cont.) 
 
Title/Author Source Country 
of origin 
Domain Method 
 
 
 
Type of 
publication 
(Wendler, 
2012) 
Level descriptor 
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D E A D A V R 
31. Development of the people first toolkit for 
construction small and medium sized 
enterprises 
Lunt, J., Bennett, V., Hopkinson, J., Holroyd, 
J., Wilde, E., Bates, S., Bell, N. and Webster, J. 
(2011) 
 
Research Report 
RR895 for the 
Health and Safety 
Executive  
United 
Kingdom 
Construction Literature 
review, meeting 
discussion, 
consultation 
with expert, 
focus group and 
interview   
Interview Matrix 
X    
Level 1: Pathological 
Level 2: Reactive 
Level 3: Calculative 
Level 4: Proactive 
Level 5: Generative 
32. Tool to be used to survey and improve safety 
culture in the European railway industry 
Bergersen, C. E. B. (2003) 
Thesis in Safety, 
Health and 
Environment 
University of 
Science and 
Technology 
Norway Rail Literature 
review, 
interview and 
focus group 
Workshop Questionnaire 
X    
Level 1: Pathological 
Level 2: Reactive 
Level 3: Calculative 
Level 4: Proactive 
Level 5: Generative 
33. Evaluation of safety culture maturity levels 
of the universities in Kenya 
Njeru, P. M., Mailutha, J. T., Gatebe, E. and 
Mburu, C. (2012) 
Proceedings of the 
2012 JKUAT 
Scientific, 
Technological and 
Industrialization 
Conference  
Kenya Education 
(Universities) 
Literature 
review 
Not reported Questionnaire 
X    
Level 1: Emerging 
Level 2: Managing 
Level 3: Involving 
Level 4: Cooperating 
Level 5: Continually 
improve 
34. Developing safety culture measurement 
tools and techniques based on site audits rather 
than questionnaires 
Fleming, M. (2007) 
Final project 
report Saint 
Mary's University 
Halifax Nova 
Scotia 
Canada Oil and gas Literature 
review and 
consultation 
with experts 
Questionnaire, 
scored card, 
interview and 
interrater 
reliability 
Interview 
X    
Level 1: Pathological 
Level 2: Reactive 
Level 3: Calculative 
Level 4: Proactive 
Level 5: Generative 
35. Safety culture maturity in upstream: oil and 
gas industry in Thailand  
Vongvitayapirom, B. and Phusavat, K. (2013) 
Proceedings of 
2013 International 
Conference on 
Technology 
Innovation and 
Industrial 
Management 
Thailand Oil and gas Literature 
review 
Questionnaire Questionnaire 
X    
Level 1: Pathological 
Level 2: Reactive 
Level 3: Calculative 
Level 4: Proactive 
Level 5: Generative 
36.Safety culture in a service 
company: a case study 
Guldenmund, F. W. (2008) 
Journal of 
Occupational 
Health and Safety 
– Australia and 
New Zealand 
The 
Netherlands 
Non-destructive 
research 
Application of 
the maturity 
developed in 
publication 1 
Questionnaire See Publication 
number 1 
  X  
Level 1: Pathological 
Level 2: Reactive 
Level 3: Calculative 
Level 4: Proactive 
Level 5: Generative 
 
 
Table 3: Applying the categorisation framework (cont.) 
 
Title/Author Source Country 
of origin 
Domain Method 
 
 
 
Type of 
publication 
(Wendler, 
2012) 
Level descriptor 
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D E A D A V R 
37. Meaningful and effective consultation and 
the construction industry of Victoria, Australia 
Ayers, G. F., Culvenor, J. F., Sillitoe, J. and 
Else, D. (2013) 
 
Construction 
Management and 
Economics 
Australia Construction Literature 
review 
Not reported Documental 
analyses 
X    
Level 1: Pathological 
Level 2: Reactive 
Level 3: Calculative 
Level 4: Proactive 
Level 5: Generative 
38. A multidimensional approach to studying 
safety culture in health care 
Law, M. P., Parker, D., Lawrie, M. and Baker, 
G. R. (2008) 
Proceedings of the 
International 
Conference of 
Healthcare 
Systems and 
Ergonomics and 
Patient Safety  
Canada and 
United 
Kingdom 
Healthcare Application of 
the maturity 
model 
developed in 
Publication 8 
Questionnaire See Publication 
number 8 
   X 
Level 1: Pathological 
Level 2: Reactive 
Level 3: Calculative 
Level 4: Proactive 
Level 5: Generative 
39. Understanding and Changing the Patient 
Safety Culture in Canadian Hospitals 
Law, M. P. (2011) 
Thesis submitted  
for the degree of 
Doctor of 
Philosophy 
University of 
Toronto 
Canada Healthcare Application of 
the maturity 
developed in 
publication 3 
Questionnaire See Publication 
number 3 
  X  
Level 1: Pathological 
Level 2: Reactive 
Level 3: Calculative 
Level 4: Proactive 
Level 5: Generative 
40. Towards the definition of an OHS 
management maturity model and assessment 
tool 
Chen, S. (2016) 
Thesis for the 
degree of Master 
 in Politecnico di 
Milano 
China Non-specific 
domain 
Application of 
the maturity 
model 
developed  in 
Publication 13 
See Publication 
number 13 
Questionnaire 
 X   
Level 1: Pathological 
Level 2: Reactive 
Level 3: Bureaucratic 
Level 4: Proactive 
Level 5: Generative 
41. Perceived safety culture of healthcare 
providers in hospitals in the Philippines 
Jabonete, F. G. and Concepcion, L. R. (2016) 
Journal of 
Sciences, 
Technology and 
Arts Research 
The 
Philippines 
Healthcare Not reported Focus group 
and consultation 
with expert 
Questionnaire 
X    
Level 1: Pathological 
Level 2: Reactive 
Level 3: Bureaucratic 
Level 4: Proactive 
Level 5: Generative 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Methods used to develop, evaluate and apply the maturity model 
 
Method  Develop Evaluate Apply 
Literature 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 
15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 
  
47 
28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37 
Interview 1, 8, 14, 19, 31, 32 2, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 31, 34 2, 6, 14, 18, 19, 20, 34 
Matrix   1, 4, 7, 8, 9, 15, 31 
Consultation with expert 5, 8, 15, 17, 31, 34 41  
Focus group 9, 12, 31, 32 1, 8, 9, 36, 41 4, 12, 18, 19 
Questionnaire 3, 17, 34 3, 5, 6, 13, 17, 27, 28, 34, 35, 36, 
38, 39 
3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13, 17, 18, 26, 28, 
30, 32, 33, 35, 40, 41 
Documental analysis 17, 19 2 2, 14, 16, 19, 20, 37 
Meeting discussion 4, 31   
Observation   16 
Scored Card  34  
Inter-rater reliability  34  
Workshop  15, 32 24 
Triangulation   2, 4, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20 
Accident analysis  29  
Comparison  6, 36, 34, 39  
No reported 41 4, 10, 11, 14, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 
25, 30, 33, 37 
12, 21, 22, 23, 25, 29 
Table 5: Type of publication (Wendler, 2012) 
 
Type of publication Publication Frequency 
Maturity model development 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 33 
48 
14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 
28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 41 
Maturity model application 18, 24, 26, 40 4 
Maturity model validation 36, 39 2 
Maturity model reliability 27, 38 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Table 6: Level descriptor 
    
Publication Level descriptor Frequency 
1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 17, 18, Level 1: Pathological 28 
49 
19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 27, 26, 28, 
29, 32, 34, 36, 35, 37, 38, 39, 
40, 41 
Level 2: Reactive 
Level 3: Calculative or bureaucratic 
Level 4: Proactive 
Level 5: Generative 
6A, 11, 12, 24, 30, 33 Level 1: Emerging 
Level 2: Managing 
Level 3: Involving 
Level 4: Cooperating 
Level 5: Continually improve 
6 
4 Level A 
Level B 
Level C 
Level D 
Level E 
1 
 
5 Level 1: Doubt 
Level 2: React 
Level 3: Know 
Level 4: Predict 
Level 5: Internalize 
1 
 
6B Level 1: Uncertainty 
Level 2: Core 
Level 3: Extended 
Level 4: Leading Edge 
Level 5: World Class 
1 
 
10 Level 1: Uncommitted 
Level 2: Drifters 
Level 3: Improvers 
Level 4: Award winners  
Level 5: World Class 
1 
 
15 Level 1: Documenting 
Level 2: Controlling 
Level 3: Engaging 
Level 4: Participating  
Level 5: Institutionalising 
1 
Table 6: Level descriptor (cont.) 
 
Publication Level descriptor Frequency 
16 Level 1: Amoral calculators 1 
50 
Level 2: Dependent 
Level 3: Doubters 
Level 4: Proactive compliers 
Level 5: Leaders 
 
21 Level 1: Initial 
Level 2: Managed 
Level 3: Preventive 
Level 4: Matured 
Level 5: Optimized 
1 
 
31 Level 1: Starting blocks 
Level 2: Getting going 
Level 3: Walking 
Level 4: Running 
Level 5: Sprinting 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Validity and reliability 
 
 Publications with evidence that was carried out Frequency Publications without evidence that was carried out Frequency 
Reliability 2, 3, 13, 17, 27, 28, 31, 34, 35, 38, 41 11 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 30 
51 
22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 32, 33, 36, 37, 39, 40 
Content Validity 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 12, 15, 17, 29, 31, 32, 34, 41 14 2, 4, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 
26, 27, 28, 30, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 
27 
Face Validity 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 12, 15,17, 29, 31, 32, 34, 41 14 2, 4, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 
26, 27, 28, 30, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 
27 
Convergent Validity 6, 34, 36, 39 4 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 
19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 
35, 37, 38, 40,  41 
37 
Discriminant Validity 2, 34 2 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 
19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 35, 
36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 
39 
Reliability + Validity 
(face, content, 
convergent and 
discriminant) 
34 1 4, 10, 11, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 30, 
33, 37, 40 
18 
 
  
52 
Figure 1: Quality Management Maturity Grid (Crosby, 1979) and Capability Maturity Model (Paulk et al., 1993) 
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Figure 2: Typology of organisations (Westrum, 1993) 
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                        Figure 3: Year of publication  
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Figure 4: Maturity model development over time 
 
 
